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Simulation-based education (SBE) has the potential to misrepresent clinical practice as relatively simplistic,
and as being made safer through simplistic behavioural explanations. This review provides an overview of a
well-documented and robust psychological construct - hindsight bias in the context of learning in healthcare
simulations. Motivating this review are our observations that post-simulation debriefings may be oversimplified
and biased by knowledge of scenario outcomes. Sometimes only limited consideration is given to issues that might
be relevant to management in the complexity and uncertainty of real clinical practice. We use literature on hindsight
bias to define the concept, inputs and implications. We offer examples from SBE where hindsight bias may occur and
propose suggestions for mitigation. Influences of hindsight biases on SBE should be addressed by future studies.Background
Hindsight bias can be defined as the tendency to over-
estimate the foreseeability, inevitability, or likelihood of
outcomes after they become manifest and known [1, 2].
This can systematically influence perceptions of past
events [1, 2], and therefore potentially the processes of
reflection, debriefing, and learning. Debriefing that in-
cludes a deliberate re-examination of simulation experi-
ences is established practice [3–6], and studies have
investigated methods of promoting learners’ reflections
[7, 8]. However, the potential influences of hindsight bias
on the nature of reflective processes in this context are
unknown, as there is a gap in the literature exploring
this issue [9]. The purpose of this commentary is to re-
view hindsight bias in simulation-based education (SBE).
Using a vignette, the review explores our notion that
debriefing is sometimes oversimplified and biased by
outcome knowledge. We have observed that on occasion
only limited consideration is given to potentially relevant
issues related to the complexities of clinical practice.
Often entailing multiple, dynamic, and sometimes con-
flicting demands and goals, clinical practice is complex.
Such demands and goals are context-dependent, and
exist under conditions of variable time pressure. We
describe features of the hindsight bias literature,* Correspondence: al@myanaesthetist.com.au
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(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zeincluding the broad empirical support base, and the
types of populations and contexts where hindsight bias
has been investigated. The potential relevance and impli-
cations of hindsight bias to SBE are then examined and
strategies to mitigate their impact offered.
Simulation-based education for complex clinical practice
When conducting or observing debriefings, there are
occasions where it might be suitable to explore a broad
range of factors related to how and why learners man-
aged a simulation scenario the way they did, in the face
of uncertainty and complexity. After all, management in
the context of uncertainty and complexity is surely an
indisputable feature of clinical practice. However, it is
our experience that when examining past simulation
events (debriefing), there is a tendency for facilitators
and learners to construct and accept very simplified
explanations for actions and occurrences. These expla-
nations seem to fail to account for the complexity
encountered by participants in the simulation.
The vignette in Box 1 is used to illustrate relevant con-
cepts. The situation is likely to resonate with many facil-
itators during debriefing. A timely call for assistance can
have significant implications to patient morbidity and
mortality, and may therefore be considered an important
learning point [10]. As learners demonstrate this step in
subsequent simulations, often immediately prompted by
any sign of patient deterioration, it is reasonable to think
that this learning point was successfully processed. Theis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
ro/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Box 1 Vignette of an inter-professional simulation
An inter-professional high-fidelity crisis simulation session was conducted
with a group of senior medical and nursing students.
The learning objectives were to:
• Demonstrate management of a deteriorating ward patient
• Demonstrate advanced life support
• Demonstrate crisis resource management skills
The scenario involved a ward patient who is complaining of nausea and
dizziness, but with normal vital signs. This was initially conducted with
one medical and one nursing student.
During the first few minutes of the simulation, the medical student
carried out initial diagnostic and therapeutic interventions with the
assistance of the nursing student.
When the patient’s blood pressure dropped mildly, the students made
intensive efforts to quickly establish intravenous access and set up
intravenous fluids.
The medical student stated that he was unsure about the diagnosis and
he re-examined the patient. The patient’s blood pressure briefly improved,
but then rapidly declined and he progressed to cardiac arrest.
After the cardiac arrest was diagnosed, the medical student requested
that the nursing student leave to call for help.
Resuscitation activities initially appeared to be very challenging in the
face of limited human resources.
During debriefing in a separate room with all students present and
watching, the facilitator used video playback to replay the scenario
up to and including the initial cardiac arrest management.
The facilitator asked the lead medical student participant to discuss
their experience. The student stated that he should have requested
for extra assistance much earlier, as this would have helped with
the arrest resuscitation.
The facilitator agreed, and in the subsequent discussion, several of
the other simulation participants stated that they would call for
help early in future.
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a range of potential concerns faced by practitioners in
the moment during a clinical situation. These may in-
clude assessing and managing the patient’s immediate
condition, resolving diagnostic dilemmas, prioritising
tasks and deciding when and where to allocate scarce
human resources. Further, they are to be accomplished
when the trajectory of the patient’s progress is uncertain
and unknown.
In the face of such a situation, the judgement of when
to relinquish immediately valuable and limited human
resources to call for help is unlikely to be a clear and
easy one. A learner who is overwhelmed with negotiat-
ing competing demands and goals might even overlook
the decision-making step of seeking extra assistance
for a prolonged period of time. This picture of
context-specific complexity contrasts sharply with that
of relative simplicity made with hindsight during the
debriefing described in our vignette.
In light of knowledge that the patient progressed to
cardiac arrest, it is possible to look back at the simula-
tion and conclude that calling for help early was obvious
and would have avoided challenges encountered withthe arrest resuscitation. It might also seem that this
learning point is simply and easily transferable to the
management of future situations in practice. These con-
clusions, however, fail to address the practical issue of
how the participants are to go about recognising and re-
solving this decision-making step amongst a number of
other potential issues, particularly when the patient’s
progress will not be readily foreseeable.
Debriefing discourse of learners and facilitators often
simplifies the examination of past events, and in a way
that is influenced by the knowledge of actual outcomes
of the simulation. Specifically, this simplification leads to
appraisals of actions made in light of simulation out-
comes, even though these outcomes may not have
necessarily eventuated from the same set of antecedent
events, and could not have necessarily been foreseeable
by learners within the simulation. In the vignette, the
patient condition may not have progressed to cardiac
arrest, and intense management efforts made by the
two learners may have delayed or even prevented de-
terioration. From this perspective, which does not as-
sume the inevitability of the patient progressing to
cardiac arrest, the decision of when to call for help
becomes less obvious. By calling for help early in
future simulations, participants might be demonstrat-
ing that they have learned management for simulation
rather than for clinical practice.
If simplification as described earlier might limit the
learning that occurs for complex clinical practice, then
this may have consequences for patient management
and safety. Why is it that simplification occurs and is
evident in both facilitators and learners? Fenwick and
Dahlgren have recently noted limitations in SBE
highlighting complexity theory as a means to “make vis-
ible important material dynamics, and their problematic
consequences, that are not often noticed in simulated
experiences…”(Fenwick & Dahlgren 2015, p. 359; em-
phasis added) [11]. That is, they acknowledge not only
the interpersonal relationships of those involved in the
simulation but confer at least equal power on the envir-
onment and other artefacts shaping behaviours. We
propose hindsight bias as one possible answer to this
question.
Review strategy
We searched the databases of PsychINFO, PubMed,
ERIC, CINAHL plus, Web of Science, and SCOPUS
using the terms: ‘hindsight bias’ AND ‘simulation’ – no
articles dedicated to exploring hindsight bias in SBE
were found. The same databases were searched with the
terms: ‘hindsight bias’ AND ‘reflection’ – only one rele-
vant empirical study was found. The same databases
were then searched with the term: ‘hindsight bias’, which
generated 763 unique articles. Of these, two recent
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the hindsight bias literature [2, 12]. These were se-
lected for outlining definitions, inputs and implica-
tions of hindsight bias. Further details on selected
topics were found by searching for articles with: ‘spe-
cific term’ (e.g., video) AND ‘hindsight bias’ in the
same databases. Additionally, the references of articles
were used to identify relevant articles. All databases
were searched on September 1 2014. Cognitive psych-
ology books were also used.
Cognitive biases and hindsight bias: definitions and
consequences
Cognitive psychology describes cognitive biases as men-
tal processes, that lead to systematic deviations in judge-
ment from a norm [13]. A norm in this case, “reflects
what should be the outcome of a task carried out ration-
ally or in a manner suitable to the situation at hand”
(Caverni et al. 1990, p.8) [13]. So using the vignette, an
assertion could be made that a ‘rational’ and ‘suitable’ re-
examination of the simulation includes an articulation
and exploration of several factors and conditions related
to management in the face of complexity and uncer-
tainty as experienced by practitioners in the moment.
This would contrast with a re-examination that offers a
single cause and effect explanation or one that supports
a potentially unforeseeable outcome.
Cognitive biases are considered to be unconscious,
automatic, mental processing strategies, which have
evolved as adaptive mechanisms to simplify complex
information inputs, yet as a result, lead to biased judge-
ments and inferences [14]. Additionally, individuals lack
awareness for how these biases might impact their per-
ception. That is, they do not realise that their judge-
ments are biased [15]. Hindsight bias belongs to a group
of biases where simplification involves a mental em-
phasis on factors that confirm or support a known out-
come, while diminishing the significance of those
identifiable factors that may favour potentially different
or even contradictory outcomes [12]. Biases clearly do
not prevent valuable reflective judgements and learning
processes from occurring. The key issue is that with the
tendency for simplification of this nature, the judge-
ments and inferences are necessarily limited and biased.
In SBE, this might have implications for what aspects of
the simulation facilitators and learners notice and focus
on, and hence possibly the scope and nature of learning
opportunities that might be derived from reflecting.
In their review of the hindsight bias literature, Roese
and Vohs summarised two important consequences of
hindsight bias [2].
1. The first consequence is the construction and
focus on unitary or limited causal narratives forexplaining past events in relation to known
outcomes, particularly with attribution of
responsibility given to those most proximal to
a particular outcome [2, 16, 17]. Thus hindsight
bias leads to simple causal explanations that
link to a manifest outcome, even though such
explanations may be flawed [2]. Some empirical
studies demonstrate hindsight bias occurrence
depends on a plausible cause being identified
and linked to an outcome [18, 19]. This feature
of hindsight bias resonates with our experience
of the explanations of simulation events found
in debriefing discourse. In the vignette, the
construction and acceptance of a simple causal
link between a late call for help by the lead
participant, and the difficult arrest resuscitation
illustrates this point.
2. The second consequence is overconfidence in
analysing and performing in similar future
situations [2, 20]. This is thought due to
hindsight bias minimising detailed scrutiny of
past personal performances, leading to a false sense
of heightened self-belief for future performance [2].
It may lead to a failure to appreciate and address the
breadth and depth of factors at play when making
similar future decisions – with potentially hazardous
consequences. Using the vignette, the learners may
be confident that they have learned to appropriately
call for help early in future. However, they might fail
to do so if they do not recognise the conditions
that may or may not favour such an intervention in
the clinical context. For example, a more explicit
reflection upon conditions such as the concurrent
presence of diagnostic uncertainty, vital sign changes
and the limited number of novice practitioners,
may support learners to quickly recognise similar
conditions and act by calling for help early.
Hindsight bias empirical evidence and investigation in
other contexts
In contrast with other potentially relevant cognitive bias
constructs, an extensive literature base supports hind-
sight bias. A recent psychology review identified over
800 published articles on this bias [2]. Cognitive psych-
ology researchers describe hindsight bias as a ‘robust’
phenomenon - that is, observable under a wide variety
of experimental conditions [12, 21–23]. It has been mea-
sured and demonstrated across age groups [21, 24], and
in different cultures [25, 26]. It has been investigated in
a variety of domains, including legal decision-making
[27], medical diagnosis and malpractice claims [28–30],
forecasting in finance [31], elections [32], consumer sat-
isfaction studies [33], and accident investigations [34].
Safety experts have frequently cited hindsight bias as a
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issues in relation to analysing accident investigations - this
can lead to investigation reports that may not maximise
learning to improve future safety [35–38]. In some of
these contexts, implications also extend to consequences
regarding the attribution of blame or negligence.
One article was found that studied the effect of hind-
sight bias in relation to nurses’ reflective practices.
Nurses were asked to read the same written clinical
vignette describing a patient’s clinical presentation, with
or without a final physician statement offering a single
likely patient diagnosis (either the correct diagnosis, or
one from a limited set of incorrect differentials). This
physician statement was considered to represent out-
come knowledge. All nurses were then asked to select
what they considered to be the most likely patient diag-
nosis from a list that included the correct diagnosis and
the limited set of incorrect differentials. Although the
study suggested that nurses who were provided with a
final physician statement tended to exhibit hindsight bias
for the offered diagnosis, whether it was correct or not,
it was acknowledged that nurses might have actually
supported that diagnosis because it was stated to have
come from a physician.
Hindsight bias inputs and managing its influences
A greater understanding of hindsight bias might be
gained through a brief exploration of its inputs, and this
might also suggest potential targets for practice and re-
search. Cognitive and metacognitive processes, rather
than motivational ones, are considered to represent the
most important factors in producing and modifying
hindsight bias [2, 12]. Roese & Vohs [2] categorised
three main cognitive memory inputs and described one
metacognitive contributor:
1. Recollection: If memories cannot be clearly and
accurately recalled, people tend to articulate distorted
‘memories’ that link closely with known outcomes.
This is considered to be a minor effect in comparison
to other inputs.
2. Belief updating: When presented with new
information, there tends to be automatic integration
with existing memory structures such that memories
most consistent with this information are reinforced,
and less congruous ones minimised [39, 40].
3. Sense-making: Simple, coherent, linear explanations
of outcomes in relation to antecedent events
provoke a sense of clear inevitability, and increase
hindsight bias [41].
4. Metacognitive contributions: The apparent subjective
ease with which we are able to form or process a
particular explanation is found to strengthen its
acceptability and increase hindsight bias. This isthought to be one mechanism by which playing
video representations of past events has been
demonstrated to increase hindsight bias. This is
thought to result from the depiction of past events
in clear continuity with their outcomes.
Because it is considered an automatic and unconscious
process, hindsight bias influences have proven to be
extremely difficult to eliminate [42]. Simply having know-
ledge that hindsight bias exists has not been demonstrated
to reduce it [43]. Currently, the only empirically supported
strategy that has consistently demonstrated hindsight bias
reduction is the use of counterfactual explanations [44–48].
‘Counterfactual’ means contrary to facts [49]. This in-
volves the deliberate formulation of explanations for
how potential alternative outcomes could have eventuated
from the same actual antecedent events. Conversely, it
can also involve constructing explanations for how certain
actual outcomes could have come about as a result of
different potential antecedent events. Experts consider it
effective to use at most two to three counterfactual expla-
nations, as generating more could increase hindsight bias,
by making it subjectively difficult from a metacognitive
point of view [2, 50].
In the vignette, rather than simply being designated a
consequence of oversight or error, the delayed call for
assistance ‘outcome’ could be reformulated to be a func-
tion of diverted attention toward immediate diagnosis
and management. These immediate and intense manage-
ment efforts can also be articulated as having had the
purpose and potential to minimise patient deterioration.
This plausible counterfactual explanation offers a poten-
tial alternative outcome (of delaying or preventing
deterioration) for the same actual antecedent events
(initial management actions). After acknowledging this
complexity and uncertainty, a discussion may then
follow which includes an appraisal of the conditions that
did or did not favour an earlier call for help, and how
these might be recognised and acted upon in a timely
manner in future.
Potential implications of hindsight bias to learning and
simulation practices
Experiential learning theories share learner reflection of
an experience as a key stage of the learning process,
whereby a learner needs to “…recapture, notice and re-
evaluate their experience, to work with their experience,
to turn it into learning" (Boud et al. 1993, p. 9) [51]. A
number of complex contextual factors might interact
and influence the learner’s reflective process, including,
but not limited to those related to the learner, the facili-
tator, the simulation design and so forth. Clearly then,
hindsight bias is only one such factor that might modify
this process alongside others. However, despite the
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judgement formation, hindsight bias does have a strong
empirical basis and has been demonstrated to be robust.
There is compelling reason to suggest that it also has
relevance in SBE, even if these involve variable and
unique contexts and conditions. As such, further investi-
gation seems warranted. Additionally, unlike other disci-
plines, in SBE we have the opportunity to modify future
simulation experiences that will then be re-examined in
debriefings. This might mean that beyond introducing
counterfactual explanations to the debriefing, reducing
hindsight bias through elements of simulation design
may be possible. Understanding hindsight bias might
serve as a useful perspective to critically appraise various
simulation and debriefing practices. Clearly, any modifica-
tions to practices would need to be contextualised and
balanced with other goals and overriding concerns. Below
we outline some considerations and theoretical strategies
to mitigate the impact of hindsight bias in SBE.
Simulation design and debrief timing
 The pause and discuss method of debriefing, based
Schön’s reflection-in-action [52–54], may prove
valuable. With pauses occurring prior to significant
simulation outcomes manifesting, this may help
with exploring and addressing immediate learner
perceptions within a simulation experience by
preventing belief updating and sense-making tied
to particular outcomes.
 Ending a simulation scenario prior to a significant
deterioration might be another useful strategy.
In our vignette, designing and running subsequent
simulations where patient arrest or progressive
deterioration does not occur would be one way
of shifting focus toward decision-making and
management in conditions of uncertainty, and
away from perceptions of inevitability.
 Simulations with less experienced learners may be
more at risk of oversimplification during debriefing.
This can be addressed in scenario design (not single
cause and effect relationships), during briefing
(alerting learners to multifactorial antecedents),
during the simulation (a confederate may introduce
complexity) and during debriefing (proposing did
you notice questions with counterfactuals).
Video-assisted debriefing
 Through the clear depiction of events in continuity
with outcomes, video-assisted debriefing might
increase hindsight bias and this could challenge the
intuitive assumption made by some simulation experts
that video playback “…allow[s] participants to seehow they performed rather than how they thought
they performed, and…help reduce hindsight bias
in assessment of the scenario.” (Fanning & Gaba
2007, p. 122) [3].
 Multiple visual perspectives (display clip from
different camera angles) may interrupt the apparent
simple linearity by which events may appear to be
linked to one another when viewing from a single
point [2].
 A facilitator could replay selected clips and direct
learners focus to different physical locations, events
or issues that were occurring simultaneously.
 To raise awareness and test hindsight bias, a facilitator
could pause a video during playback and ask learners
what happened next.
Facilitators
 Facilitators hold significant power during debriefing
[55] and therefore influence what learners focus on
and how they judge their performances.
 A facilitator’s understanding of events borne of
hindsight might help learners to focus on areas that
yield valuable learning points. The potential pitfall
is that from within this perspective, there may be
an inadequate exploration of a variety of learner-
centred concerns encountered in simulation.
This concern also extends to facilitators debriefing
one another.
 Facilitators may consider the potential influence of
debriefing techniques that offer or ask for simple
causal explanations linking learner actions and
outcomes such as, in the advocacy and inquiry
approach, where the facilitator promotes learner
reflection by stating a combination of what is
termed an advocacy statement – that is, an
observation of learner action[s] and subjective
judgment of this observation, with an inquiry
statement [56]. Although this can prompt the
learner to notice elements related to the complexity
of a situation, the structure of the advocacy
statement can sometimes be one that links a learner
action with a specified outcome through a single,
plausible, explanatory narrative. This might increase
hindsight bias in participants. A potential strategy is
to avoid single explanations and introduce at least
one other counterfactual in the advocacy statement.
In seeking to notice and address issues of complexity
and uncertainty, research might also be directed at
defining a set of relevant contextual factors or condi-
tions related to management in complex situations. This
may lead to debriefings discussing issues experienced in
the moment during complex clinical practice. This
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certain actions being taken, whether these were intended
or not. Potential debriefing topics could include issues
and constructs such as: managing competing goals, task
prioritisation, resource allocation strategies in time-
critical and/or resource-poor situations, recognising and
managing cognitive overload and fixation errors. Also,
potentially relevant could be sociocultural barriers to
making certain decision-making steps, including per-
ceived consequences of decisions and issues surrounding
power imbalances. Of course, these could not all be
addressed in the same debriefing, but across a number
of sessions, and according to specific learning objectives,
simulation experiences, learner populations, and import-
antly, learner concerns. These conceptual distinctions
could be focused on during reflection, and form the
basis for articulations during debriefing discourse. Con-
sequently, this might enable learning that is more
aligned to complex, context-specific, clinical practice.
Conclusions
Clinical practice often involves complexity and uncer-
tainty, and learning from SBE should address issues
related to management in these contexts. Drawing on
findings from published reviews of hindsight bias, the
construct has an extensive empirical foundation, and is
pervasive across a variety of contexts. During debrief-
ings, hindsight bias might lead to oversimplification of
explanations of simulation events, with a failure to
acknowledge issues related to management in complex
situations, as they are experienced in the moment by
learners. This might influence facilitators and learners,
leading to a failure to address learning opportunities that
might be relevant to patient management in practice.
Knowing that the bias exists has not been demonstrated
to influence its effects. Given we do not know the im-
pact of oversimplification during debriefing on subse-
quent practice, it is an important target for further
inquiry and research, together with inputs and conse-
quences of hindsight bias for all facets of SBE.
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